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Political trials and the suppression of popular radicalism in England, 1799-1820  
 
The Napoleonic Wars and their aftermath were an intense but challenging period in the 
development of the parliamentary reform movement in Britain. The revival of working-class 
participation in the democratic movement and a wider range of tactics and types of collective 
agitation created new challenges for local and national authorities. The locus of activity 
shifted away from London, in particular to the economically-depressed industrial regions of 
the North and Midlands, where the rapidly populating towns lacked political representation. 
The new Hampden clubs drew up petitions to government on the “mass platform”, huge open 
meetings addressed by local and national speakers on a stage.1 These mass meetings were, for 
both local and national authorities, a revolutionary threat on a different scale from the radical 
principles contained in pamphlet literature. Legislation introduced from 1799 onwards 
against corresponding societies and trades combinations sought to suppress the mass platform 
movement, with specific acts against seditious meetings passed in 1795, 1817 and 1819.2 At 
times of more specific threat, in the aftermath of the Irish Rebellion between 1799 and 1801 
and then during the winter of 1816-17, when mass meetings at Spa Fields in London 
organised by the republican Spenceans descended into rioting, the government looked to 
other legislative means. The Suspension of Habeas Corpus acts of 1799 and 1817 enabled the 
Home Secretary to issue direct arrest warrants against suspect radical activists without 
promise of trial. Samuel Bamford, leader of the radicals of Middleton, Lancashire, 
commented in his autobiography about the situation in 1817:  
 
King's messengers did arrive: Government warrants were issued; and the persons they 
mentioned were taken to prison. A cloud of gloom and mistrust hung over the whole 
country. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was a measure the result of which 
we young reformers could not judge, save by report, and that was of a nature to cause 
anxiety in the most indifferent of us. The proscriptions, imprisonments, trials, and 
banishments of 1792 were brought to our recollections by the similarity of our 
situation to those of the sufferers of that period. It seemed as if the sun of freedom 
were gone down, and a rayless expanse of oppression had finally closed over us.3  
 
For Bamford and his fellow radicals, their imprisonments without trial were evidence of 
government corruption that traduced rights and principles established by Magna Carta. At 
least their predecessors in the 1790s could seek to defend their principles and protest their 
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innocence at the bar; those detained under direct warrant from the Home Secretary had no 
such recourse to what they regarded as a fundamental constitutional right: to be tried by jury.4  
The loyalist reaction to popular radicalism was severe, but it was never total nor 
tyrannical. This chapter examines the difficulties of prosecuting and bringing individuals to 
trial for political offences in this period as well as during some of the trials that took place. It 
first analyses the decision-making process between the Home Office and the government’s 
law officers, the Attorney and Solicitor General, whose records lie in a series of pre-
prosecution correspondence now in the National Archives.5 The term state trial suggests a 
more centralised and government-led process of repression of popular radicalism than it was 
in practice. Historians of political movements in this period understandably focus on the 
radical leaders tried at the King’s Bench, and whose state trials became well known through 
pamphlet literature and self-publicity.6 But the reality for many radical leaders was closer to 
home. Provincial reformers usually faced a battle working through the complex layers of the 
local justice system in their home town and county: the bench of local magistrates and the 
county quarter sessions and special assizes. And it was these authorities who arguably were 
the most “loyalist”: there are reams of correspondence in the Home Office archives from 
magistrates, mayors, clergy and other local elites concerning their anxious desire to suppress 
popular radicalism and trades agitation, all illustrating how much the workings of the state 
operated from below.7 The second part of this chapter examines the trial of the “Thirty Eight” 
Manchester radicals at Lancaster assizes in June 1812 to demonstrate the mutable definitions 
of treason, sedition and processes of justice in the theatre of the court. 
 
I 
 
Prosecution for seditious libel had been one of the main legal tools of repression of the 
radical public sphere in the 1790s. But as seen in the cases of the London Corresponding 
Society members Thomas Hardy and John Horne Tooke in 1794, several high-profile state 
trials for treason floundered over legal technicalities and the immense difficulty of proving 
the seditious intent of words.8 The rise of bold and vocal defence lawyers such as Thomas 
Erskine, who defended many of the leading radicals, also meant that the courtrooms became a 
theatre where battles were fought over semantics and the linguistic intent of speeches and 
texts rather than proving the criminality of the actions.9 The trials of the radical publishers 
William Hone and T. J. Wooler in late 1817 became a further important arena where 
prosecutors found it difficult to define seditious libel and the defence lawyer exercised skill in 
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picking holes in the ambiguities of language. As Philip Harling has argued, “the Home Office 
lacked the institutional means to embark on a policy of wholescale prosecution” against large 
demonstrations addressed by confident but linguistically careful orators.10 Furthermore, the 
battles of popular politics had moved off the page and into action onto the mass platform. In 
March 1817, following the Spa Fields riots and an attack on the Prince Regent’s coach, Home 
Secretary Lord Sidmouth issued a circular letter instructing magistrates to imprison anyone 
suspected of seditious libel. Wooler was arrested in May 1817 and charged on several counts 
relating to articles in his radical newspaper the Black Dwarf. Hone was arrested a week later 
on charges of publishing blasphemous libels. Wooler’s and Hone’s acquittals at the King’s 
Bench again tested the efficacy of this sort of political trial as a means of repressing the 
democratic movement.11 
As evidence for the declining trend in prosecution for seditious libel, Harling 
examined the crown rolls of the court of King’s Bench, which included seventy-three 
indictments and one hundred and sixty-six ex officio informations (a summons filed by the 
Attorney General that required the accused to appear in court) for seditious and blasphemous 
libels recorded between 1790 and 1832.12 Here it is instructive to compare his findings with 
evidence from the previous step in the process before the prosecutions even got to court. The 
first step often lay with local authorities such as justices of the peace and mayors of towns, 
who expressed their suspicions about individuals and forwarded pamphlets and newspapers 
that they deemed seditious or libellous to the Home Office.13 The Home Secretary would 
then pass on the relevant information to the Attorney General and Treasury Solicitor for their 
opinion on whether or not to prosecute by ex officio information.14 The decision to take a 
more direct route than prosecuting through the county or special assizes was not taken lightly. 
The Treasury Solicitor, recruited from the practising bar from 1806 onwards, was responsible 
for briefing counsel in state prosecutions for treason and sedition. The Attorney General and 
his deputy the Solicitor General were the main legal advisors to the government, and could 
commence proceedings by ex officio informations laid in the King’s Bench. This process in 
effect by-passed both committal proceedings and the grand jury, but it also passed the costs 
on to the government.15 Hence it was in the local magistrates’ financial interest to secure a 
government prosecution, while conversely the Home Secretary would seek to pass the case 
back to the county unless there was a perceived direct threat to the state.  
The Treasury Solicitor’s papers at the National Archives contain multiple volumes of 
“opinion books” in which their decisions were recorded.16 Table 9.1 shows a summary of the 
balance of decisions made by the law officers in relation to first, whether there was evidence 
4 
 
of seditious libel or behaviour, and secondly, whether it would be enough to bring the 
accused to trial at the King’s Bench. 
 
Date range 
of 
Treasury 
Solicitor’s 
“opinion 
book” 
Decision: 
prosecute 
through ex 
officio 
information 
Decision: 
extracts are 
libellous but 
no opinion 
on 
prosecution 
Decision: 
not enough 
evidence to 
prosecute, 
or referred 
to 
indictment 
at the 
quarter 
sessions 
Decision: 
extracts 
are not 
libellous 
Decision: 
referred to 
prosecution 
for seditious 
assembly or 
trade 
combination 
Total 
1808-10  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1812  6 0 5 5 0 21 
1813-15  2 0 2 1 1  6 
1816 0 0 1 0 3  4 
1817  0 0 2 1 2  5 
1818-19  1 0 3 1 0 5 
1819-20  4 13 7 5 0 29 
Total 13 13 20 13 6 70 
 
Table 9.1. Decisions made by law officers recorded in “opinion books”, 1808-20. Source: 
TNA, TS 25/3, 5-8, 2034-5, Treasury Solicitor’s papers. 
 
Seventy cases were put before the law officers and recorded in the opinion books, in 
amongst hundreds of other types of legal enquiries.17 The low figure is not surprising, and 
indeed reflect Harling’s findings of a relatively small number of cases that parallel the 
general pattern of waves of interest in prosecuting the reform movement. While Harling 
calculated peaks of indictments and ex officio informations in 1810, 1817, 1820 and 1821, the 
precursory step in the process of the Home Office consulting with the law officers about the 
potential to prosecute peaked in 1812 (twenty-one cases) and 1819-20 (twenty-nine cases). It 
usually took months to gather evidence and bring individuals to trial, while those arrested 
under the 1817 Suspension of Habeas Corpus Act did not need to go through the intermediary 
processes of a magistrate’s warrant and quarter sessions, so also were not reflected here. Not 
all the law officers’ recommendations were followed by the Home Office; but as Harling 
notes, even when cases were brought to King’s Bench, in 1808-12 the sentencing rate for 
libel was only twenty per cent; and even at the height of repression in 1817-22, only thirty-
eight per cent of those prosecuted were tried, convicted and sentenced to prison.18 Notably, 
none of the decisions made in 1812 in favour of prosecution was for seditious libel, but rather 
5 
 
for taking illegal oaths, unlawful assembly or fomenting “tumult and disturbance” during the 
Luddite machine-breaking agitation, especially in Lancashire.19 The revival of the democratic 
movement from 1816 onwards then pushed the government into seeking to prosecute radical 
printers and orators once more.20 The Chronicle, The People and Sherwin’s Political Register 
were examined for seditious libel, but again, although the law officers considered for 
example the latter a “mischievous publication”, none was considered a likely case for 
prosecution.21  
The opinion books also reveal the complex and often ambiguous decisions taken by 
all parties concerned about whether to prosecute at all. The problematic definition of 
seditious libel caused the greatest doubts about the potential for successful prosecution. In 
1813-15, cases of seditious libel were considered collectively against the newspapers, 
Morning Chronicle, Statesman, Examiner and the Carlisle Journal, but the law officers 
dismissed them, noting the “difficulty and much delicacy in stating and proving the real facts 
necessary to explain libels”. By contrast, they recommended prosecution of the Nottingham 
Review for publishing a threatening letter signed by “General Ludd”, which they felt would 
inspire a revival of the Luddite movement in the East Midlands.22 Harling argues that this 
shift of focus reflected the change of ministry. Whereas in 1808-11, Spencer Perceval’s 
government saw the radical press as a significant threat to “Church-and-King” values, by 
contrast, from 1812 until the end of the Napoleonic wars, Lord Liverpool was concerned 
more with the maintenance of public order.23 Yet even in 1812, the law officers advised 
against prosecution of some of the Luddites for lack of evidence.24 And indeed, many of the 
enquiries about the possibility of prosecution were from concerned local magistrates, 
particularly those in the Luddite regions, which the Home Office appears to have simply 
forwarded directly to the law officers and then returning their verdict.  
The risks inherent in trying radicals publicly was further weighed up against cost. 
Even the less prominent trials racked up large bills. For example, James Parr, a Chelsea 
pensioner, was indicted at Chester assizes in spring 1819 for sedition for speaking at a mass 
platform meeting at Stockport. The bill of indictment cost the Treasury eighteen pounds, 
three shillings and sixpence. Further costs mounted as the local authorities sent constables to 
the Chelsea hospital to arrest Parr. John Lloyd, the deeply loyalist solicitor and clerk to the 
magistrates of Stockport, then noted, “On bail being tendered, attending to enquire into the 
sufficiency and to administer oaths before the Justice to Thomas Stubbs and Thomas Rickle 
[sic], who notwithstanding they had sworn it they were not really worth the money and had 
attempted to deceive me as to their places of residence”. Together with other legal expenses 
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and the forty miles’ journey to Chester, Lloyd also claimed for money to retrieve witnesses 
for the prosecution, including two pounds to “witness Lowe having removed into Liverpool, 
sending thence to find him”. In total, he claimed for thirty-four pounds, five shillings and 
eightpence.25 At the trial, however, the Attorney General announced he did not want to 
prosecute the case further, and would agree to discharging Parr on a recognizance of one 
hundred pounds, which was agreed.26  
The decision not to prosecute at King’s Bench was also taken in order not to excite 
further agitation. The Libel Act of 1792 gave the jury the right to decide whether a 
publication could have provoked a breach of the peace. The offending passages would be 
read in open court and newspapers covered the legal proceedings in depth.27 In October 1818, 
for example, therefore, the law officers, S. Shepherd and R. Gifford, advised that the printer 
of a radical handbill not be prosecuted because “we very much doubt whether it could be 
made the subject of prosecution and as the spirit of combination amongst the workmen in this 
part of the County has apparently subsided a prosecution now instituted (and particularly if it 
failed) might rather tend to revive rather than extinguish it”.28 They also based their opinions 
on the likelihood of whether a Jury could be convinced of a pamphlet’s “libellous nature”, 
which they knew would be a risky gamble, not least because of the slippery definition of 
libel.29 Nevertheless, the financial and mental impact upon the prisoner as he waited between 
the filing of informations and trial was severe, whether or not the accused was eventually 
found innocent.30 
Concern mounted about the potential of radical orators stirring up gullible audiences 
to revolution through their words and actions on the mass platform rather than in print of 
pamphlets. Significantly, as Lisa Steffen and Michael Lobban have argued, political trials 
began to widen the definitions of treason and sedition, although this shift was effected in part 
because of the difficulties of ensuring conviction as it was by intent.31 The government 
increasingly sought to try radical leaders for seditious conspiracy to “overthrow the 
constitution” rather than directly attacking the king. The first notable trial on these grounds 
was of seven members of the Manchester Constitutional Society, headed by Thomas Walker, 
in 1794. But the men were acquitted because the case for the prosecution relied solely on the 
evidence of a discredited witness.32 The 1795 trial of the members of the Sheffield Society 
for Constitutional Information, Henry Redhead Yorke, Joseph Gales and Richard Davison, 
also sought to prosecute them on a charge of seditious conspiracy, explicitly in relation to 
their speeches at a mass public meeting in Sheffield.33 Treason and sedition were therefore 
associated in the loyalist (and Whiggish) formula with the state and parliament rather than 
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solely its monarchical head. This broader conception of the state as parliament was employed 
in the trials that followed, especially of the United Irish republicans in 1799 and of the 
conspirator Colonel Despard in 1803.34 The postwar revival of mass demonstrations and 
“risings” solidified this broader definition of treason as encompassing threats to parliament as 
well as, or indeed instead of, the monarch. The trials of the Spencean republicans for their 
involvement at Spa Fields in 1816, the instigators of the Pentrich “rising” in Derbyshire in 
1817, Henry Hunt and the Peterloo radicals, and the Cato Street conspirators in 1820 
furthered this process. Charles Weatherill, defence lawyer for the Spencean James Watson, 
for example, complained during the trial that the crown lawyers “have therefore, skilfully 
enough, put in four treasons, in order to perplex the subject, and to obtain by confusion which 
they could not obtain by distinctness and precision”. Although faced with a litany of 
government witnesses, Weatherill and the main defence witness Henry Hunt convinced the 
jury to find Watson not guilty and the prosecution of the other Spenceans was consequently 
dropped.35  
The post-Peterloo period marked the greatest level of government prosecution of 
radicals on a variety of charges. Local authorities were perturbed about the wave of radical 
propaganda and sought to prosecute newspapers and printers for libelling the Manchester 
magistrates and the government. The special commissions of oyer et terminer for high 
treason declined in number and frequency, prosecutions for seditious libel continued but with 
a fluctuating success rate, while charges for seditious conspiracy and disturbing the peace 
with intent against the constitution increased.36 Fifty informations and indictments for libel 
were filed at King’s Bench in 1819 to 1820. Their targets included Richard Carlile, publisher 
of the Republican, who was sentenced to six years in Dorchester gaol; and radical MP Sir 
Francis Burdett and the Spencean Unitarian minister Robert Wedderburn for denouncing the 
authorities for their actions at Peterloo. The prosecution rate for libel rose to its highest level 
of around fifty per cent, which Harling attributes to a more determined policy by the law 
officers of targeting small publishers.37 The evidence from the opinion books show that this 
was just the outcome of a much larger process of sifting potential cases. The law officers, 
faced with a bulging post-sack of printed material sent from across the country, decided that 
trying each case that ended up before them would be overwhelming and risked too many 
acquittals. Their general advice was that the smaller cases would better prosecuted locally as 
indictments at quarter sessions rather than taken to the King’s Bench. For example, John 
Hockley was apprehended on 21 August 1819 on the Strand outside the Crown and Anchor 
pub, carrying a placard advertising a meeting to be held at the venue concerning “Massacre in 
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Manchester by the Yeomanry Cavalry and the Magistrates”. The law officers recommended a 
quarter sessions indictment for inciting disturbance.38 There were nearly a hundred 
prosecutions at the assizes, from high profile reformers such as Henry Hunt at Lancaster for 
seditious conspiracy for his leading part at Peterloo to provincial radical leaders involved at 
the protest meetings and various “risings” that occurred from the autumn of 1819 to spring 
1820.39 As Malcolm Chase has noted, the success of Lord Liverpool’s ministry in containing 
the democratic movement lay less in the “big ticket” sentences passed on high profile treason 
cases like the Cato Street conspirators in 1820 than on the participation of local authorities 
over the longer period in bringing lesser offenders to trial on a range of minor charges for 
conspiracy and inciting disturbance.40 
 
II 
 
The watchword of the early nineteenth-century democratic movement in Britain was liberty. 
The language of constitutionalism was integral to the radicals’ challenge to the state’s 
definitions of treason and sedition. They did not contest the state through Paineite 
republicanism, but rather used the language and the tools of the British legal system, calling 
for the rights of the subject through reference to Magna Carta and the rights of the accused 
through opposition to packed or special juries. Political trials – more so than debates 
conducted within the reform petitions, demonstrations, pamphlets and newspapers – were 
therefore a litmus test for assuring liberty in an era of repression. Radicals came to view 
prosecutions of their peers as evidence of how the state was unconstitutional and the legal 
system was corrupted.41 The decision over whether the defendants were “seditious” or not, 
whether they could have access to constitutional freedoms or not, did not end in words or 
censorship but in the choice between freedom and imprisonment or execution. The trials in 
effect were a microcosm of the state, its powers, and the varying levels of agency or leeway 
that radicals could conduct within them. Radicals did not oppose the use of open juries, that 
is, chosen among all eligible freeholders by the Assizes, because they saw juries as 
representative institutions essential to ensuring the liberty of the citizen. They attempted to 
foster a representative space within the courtroom, to defeat the government within their own 
terms of the long traditions of individual liberties of the citizen within the law.42 
Many of the radicals facing trial were highly concerned about the packing of juries 
and the use of special juries. Their fears sprang not just from the fact that this process seemed 
to seal their fate but also from their adherence to the constitutional principle of a fair and 
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uncorrupt trial as encapsulated, as they saw it, in Magna Carta.43 When prosecution was 
decided by the law officers by ex officio information, trial at King’s Bench was by special 
jury. The jurors were selected by the Treasury Solicitor from a special list of men of higher 
social status, and in practice this meant that those selected were likely to be more favourable 
towards the government and prosecution. Horne Tooke had made allegations of jury packing 
at his 1794 trial, the issue was raised in the House of Commons in 1809, and Wooler alleged 
in 1817 that a small group of “guinea men” paid regularly by the government biased the 
jury’s decisions in favour of the government.44 Following more open criticism of the system 
by Jeremy Bentham in 1821, Robert Peel’s government eventually passed a Juries Act in 
1825, which meant that the jurors in London and Middlesex were to be selected by ballot 
rather than from the closed list.45 Yet the special juries at county assizes remained chosen by 
the Crown, and composed of gentry and aristocrats.46 A key difference between the 
metropolitan reformers -- many of whom were able to persuade the jury of their innocence 
and secure acquittal -- and the provincial radicals, was one of class. The social gap between 
the propertied judge and jurors and the working-class defendants was much more evident in 
provincial trials at quarter sessions and special assizes.. Although Hone and Wooler contested 
a corrupt and packed jury, the political and legal culture of London nevertheless enabled 
more room for manoeuvre. As Epstein notes, by contrast, elsewhere, “radicals could not as 
easily reproduce such triumphs where lists of special jurors were restricted to esquires of the 
county”.47  
The “ultra-radical” John Bagguley of Manchester, who had been arrested for giving a 
seditious speech at a reform meeting in September 1818, was imprisoned under direct warrant 
from the Home Secretary under the 1817 Suspension of Habeas Corpus Act. Informed that he 
was to be tried by special jury, Bagguley became acutely concerned about its potential to be 
packed and therefore weighted against him. He had clearly read Wooler’s editorials in the 
Black Dwarf on the subject and his pamphlet, An Appeal to the citizens of London against the 
alledged lawful mode of packing special juries of 1817. Bagguley immediately wrote to 
Wooler to seek confirmation that all freemen could serve on special juries. Wooler replied 
that they were eligible, “though for their own purpose, the agents of the Crown always make 
a point of confining the number to their own party which they think themselves more likely to 
make sure of among the Baronets and Esquires which they accordingly chuse”. He advised 
Bagguley, “The Decision of the Judges that the Master of the Crown Office had a right to 
select or pack special juries is illegal; and was given only to get rid of a dilemma as the 
readiest way I would advise you to object to the mode, to insist upon your jury being farely 
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[sic] chosen out of the list of the whole body of the freeholders of the Country”.48 Bagguley 
also sought the opinion of Sir Charles Wolseley of Staffordshire, who was also attracting the 
local authorities’ attention for his speeches at radical demonstrations (and who would be 
arrested and tried for seditious conspiracy at Chester assizes in April 1820).49 His reply 
reflected the difference in class between the two men. Whereas Wooler was defiant on 
political prisoners’ constitutional rights to a freeholder jury, Wolseley retorted that just 
because gentry chosen by the county featured did not mean that the jury was partial:  
 
I am sorry to find that you have such an objection to “Baronets” and “Esquires” to tell 
you the truth I see very little difference between them and the “merchants”. In all the 
Special Jury cases that I have had any knowledge of they have generally been 
composed of what are called County Gentlemen – but commonly there are not more 
than three or four who attend the Summons and then the rest of the Jury are made up 
of the common jurymen – this may be the case with the Jury that is to try you. 
p.s. were you not aware that every man has a right either Plaintiff or Defendant to 
Demand a Special Jury – a Special Jury is consequently something above a common 
jury.50 
 
Bagguley was tried along with his two fellow Mancunian radicals Samuel Drummond 
and John Johnston for sedition and conspiracy at the Chester spring assizes in April 1819. 
Bagguley used the court as an arena for his complaints, not least being imprisoned for nine 
months under the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Act and the huge bail placed on the men of 
one thousand pounds each, which was clearly meant to ensure they stayed imprisoned.51 
Drummond challenged that they were guilty of two counts of “inciting the people to hatred 
and contempt of Government and Constitution of your Country” and of seditious conspiracy 
against the government. He called on the Attorney General to try them on the separate 
indictment. Johnston took the trial as a stage to express his emotions against the hardships 
they had experienced in prison, and boldly addressed the judge: “My Lord, I mean to say, in 
plain words, that we have not had a fair trial. [After the prisoner had uttered these words, he 
struck the rail of the bar very violently]”. The Chief Justice was adamant about the guilt of 
the men, arguing that the Macclesfield reform meeting at which the radicals spoke was not 
intended to petition parliament for reform:  
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Its real object was to incite the people to disaffection and to take up arms against the 
government … you advised them to establish what you called a National Convention 
which was to usurp the place of Parliament and its laws … one step more and your 
offence would have amounted to High Treason.  
 
They were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and the huge amount of five hundred 
pounds sureties each for good behaviour on their release.52 
Bagguley, Johnston and Drummond were fiery orators, much to the consternation of 
the moderate reformers such as Samuel Bamford, who realised the danger inherent in taking 
such a tactic.53 They were well experienced in haranguing crowds about the need for 
democratic reform (indeed Bagguley’s inflammatory speeches in particular were the reason 
he attracted the attention of the local authorities and was arrested), and hence he felt no 
qualms in using the court as another arena in which to vent his rage at the system. The final 
section of this chapter demonstrates the role of local authorities and loyalist attitudes in 
shaping the outcomes and also the difficulties of securing prosecution because, despite 
packed juries, adherence to the letter of the law and adherence to the ideal if not always the 
reality of a fair trial persisted. 
 
III 
 
The trial of the Thirty Eight radicals of Manchester at Lancaster Assizes in August 1812 
marked a significant turning point in the development of the provincial reform movement. 
Led by the small manufacturer and veteran reformer John Knight, a group of Manchester 
radicals revived a society to petition for parliamentary reform. Hearing rumours that the 
deputy constable, Joseph Nadin, was about to arrest them at their original meeting place of 
the Elephant Inn, they adjourned to the Prince Regent’s Arms for a second meeting on 11 
June 1812. Samuel Fleming, an Irish weaver and former member of Colonel Silvester’s 
militia, informed the boroughreeve and constables of their intentions. Nadin, backed by a 
band of soldiers, entered the room and arrested the men on a charge of administering an 
illegal oath to Fleming. Following examination at the New Bailey court house in Salford, the 
prisoners were sent to Lancaster Castle to await trial at the next assizes.54 
The trial began at eleven o’clock in the morning of 27 August, and lasted fourteen 
hours in total, with the final verdict made about one in the morning of the next day.55 The 
formal indictment was made against William Washington and Thomas Broughton. The 
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Attorney General decided to make a joint charge against all thirty-eight men, stating it would 
be too repetitive to try them all separately.56 The radicals were defended by Henry Brougham 
MP, leading member of the “Mountain” wing of opposition Whigs, and two other 
sympathetic lawyers, and were financially supported by Major Cartwright, the Liverpool 
polymath William Roscoe, and other sympathetic middle-class reformers.57  
The trial was widely covered in the newspapers as it occurred in the middle of the 
Luddite machine-breaking agitation. The local authorities were desperate to clamp down on 
all forms of working-class collective action and attempted to associate radicalism with 
Luddism, and hence charged the radicals under the 1799 act against taking illegal oaths, 
rather than for treason.58 The address by the Attorney General, Mr Park, to the Lancaster jury 
asserted that the authorities intended the trial to be “of considerable use to the public”. He felt 
that the impact of the trials of dozens of Luddites at special assizes in Lancaster, York and 
Chester a few months previously had been short-lasting, not least because the defendants 
“usually conduct themselves with decorum [so] there is not that sensation produced on the 
mind which one would wish should be felt”. Park believed that this performance by the 
Luddites at their trials, and the considerable sympathy expressed for them at their executions, 
meant that “a good deal of the impression which such trials were intended to have on the 
public mind was destroyed”.59  
The early nineteenth-century trial was not a neutral or unchanging process, but 
consciously contained elements of theatre and performance. The trial process formed the 
basic script and narrative that had to be followed in the right order, but there was room for 
improvisation and response, and the outcome was not predictable. There was humour and 
tragic drama, enacted not just by the performers of the defence, prosecution and jury, but also 
often a large audience who watched and participated.60 Regency radicals were well aware of 
the potential to exploit the dramatic elements of the trial process, and played on the emotions 
of the jury and the audience. The rise of defence lawyers heightened the appetite for drama 
and made the trial appear – in the narrative at least – as able to be swayed by individual 
performances as much as by juridical interpretation of the law and evidence. Printed versions 
of the trials therefore read like a theatre script, transcribing the boos and the huzzas of the 
audience and, as Kevin Gilmartin notes, were therefore “narrative constructions” in 
themselves. In bringing the political trial to a wider audience, radical publishers thus 
extended the “radical counter public sphere”, enabling the message of radical principles and 
the heroics of those on trial to reach a wider reading audience in an era when the laws of 
seditious libel were used against those on trial and radical literature.61  
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John Knight published two versions of the trial proceedings, with an extensive 
introduction outlining the context of the case and the radicals’ innocence. He alleged that 
deputy constable Joseph Nadin had attempted to frame them. Nadin, already notorious in 
Manchester as the “thief catcher”, became the bête noire of the radical movement. At their 
earlier presentation in front of the magistrates at the New Bailey court, Nadin “became very 
active in arranging the prisoners about the bar”. Knight claimed that Nadin did this as a 
means of indicating to the informer Fleming which radical (William Washington) he wished 
him to identify as the instigator of the illegal oath. It became clear that Fleming did not 
recognise Nadin’s chosen target: 
 
[Nadin] was heard to ask Fleming whether he knew Washington? Fleming replied he 
did not: Nadin then pointing to Washington said, “That is him, in the striped waistcoat 
and spotted handkerchief; swear to him first”. Washington immediately appealed to 
the magistrates, but no notice being taken, he repeated his appeal, when Nadin was 
ordered to be removed away from Fleming; who then swore that Washington had 
administered to him and two others, an unlawful oath, about 10 o’clock on the 
evening of the 11th June.62 
 
Knight noted that Nadin’s subterfuge was made even more obvious when Fleming made a 
farcical case of mistaken identity: 
 
On being requested to point out one of the persons, he fixed upon a turnkey belonging 
to the New Bayley, named William Evans. He was then asked by the magistrates if he 
was sure that was the man, and he replied “yes I am sure”. Mr Dunstan, governor of 
the New Bayley, who was in the court, now said that was impossible for he could 
prove Evans had not been out of the New Bayley that night. As however Evans the 
turnkey sat in the very place into which Nadin had pertinaciously attempted to force 
me during his arrangement beforementioned, until ordered to desist.  
 
Perhaps Knight further played up Nadin’s character as bogeyman in the minutes of the 
Lancaster trial, but it is likely that the cross-examination by defence lawyer Mr Williams 
indeed followed the lines recorded in the pamphlet: 
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Q. (Williams) Your face is pretty well known at Manchester, there is no man so well 
known. 
A. (Nadin) I do not think there is. 
Q. People are much alarmed at seeing you in the night time.  
A. If their deeds are not evil, they have no cause to be alarmed. 
Q. You are continually going about to take men up and of course you are very 
notorious?  
A. Yes.63 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.2. Sketch of Lancaster Assizes, in The Trial at Full Length of the Thirty Eight Men 
from Manchester … (J. Plant, Sickle Street, Manchester, 1812), Working-Class Movement 
Library, Salford. 
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The sketch included in The Trial at Full Length of the Thirty Eight Men is a rare 
example of an interior scene of a provincial trial in this period. It was included in the 
proceedings to show the positioning of each of the defendants and to identify the informer 
Fleming, whose name is underlined in the key underneath the drawing and who is pictured 
standing in the gallery directly above the dock, grinning and looking towards the judge. The 
counsel for the prosecution stood directly in front of the prisoners. William Washington is 
sketched in the dock answering questions. The picture also indicates how the trial excited 
huge popular interest, with the audience packed in to watch, behind the defendants and in the 
direct view of the judge, onto the staircase and windowsill, and even women sitting right next 
to the judge. The authority of the judge and jury were symbolically demonstrated in their 
positioning at a higher level, but this difference of height also physically influenced the ways 
in which the defendants and lawyers interacted with them, the latter having to look up to 
address them. Notably in this case, the lawyers’ table was lower, illustrating how the rise of 
the defensive lawyer was still inhibited or shaped by their physical positioning within the 
court.64 
Though the theatre and spatial positionings of the court were meant to enforce the 
hierarchy and severity of the law, historians agree that this did not result in the weight of 
authority being solely on the part of the prosecution. The courtroom enabled interaction and 
participation from all sections of the process, enabling the expression of dissent from the 
defendants and the audience. The public gallery in particular was retained as an essential part 
of the scrutiny of the law’s legitimacy, and enabled the crowd to express their views and 
attempt to influence judgements.65 This was beginning to change, but not yet. Julienne 
Hanson notes the spatial aspects of the trial process, in relation both to the “lawscape” of the 
court building and to the rules governing the wider social body. In the early nineteenth 
century, the courtroom was the site where justice was “managed” and “administered” 
publicly, with most of the processes of the trial taking place in one room. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, by contrast, the management of the trial had been separated into different 
spatial sections, including separate entrances, a jury room, police cells and interview rooms, 
with the court functioning only where decisions made elsewhere were “published” publicly. 
Increased concern for “practical security, but also to prevent contamination between the 
criminal, citizen and those officiating at the ritual process” pushed forward these 
developments in trial process and spaces.66 Lancaster assizes court in 1812 fits the earlier 
model in which all participants in the trial, including the audience, were still in close 
proximity to each other and the elements of the trial took place mostly in one space. The 
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prosecution was obviously concerned about the radicals’ potential to sway the jury by words 
and looks. This also included the sympathetic audience. The trial report noted how “the 
Attorney General requested that javelin men might be placed round the Bar to keep the 
people off and prevent them from speaking to the prisoners, which was accordingly 
ordered”.67 But the defence was also keenly aware of the attempts of the prosecution to 
influence the witnesses by similar means. One of the defence lawyers requested that the 
witnesses on both sides be ordered to leave while evidence was given about Fleming’s 
involvement.68 The role of body language in shaping the trial’s progress and interpretation of 
the evidence was evident in Brougham’s sardonic retort to Park’s accusation that he was 
trying to influence the jury: 
 
I am not saying anything: I am sitting with my back to the Jury and am not armed, as 
the learned Attorney General is with the power of making a long address to the Jury. 
He is not only anticipating what he thinks we may say, but what he knows we have 
not the power to say. He interprets my looks – he expresses surprise and distrust, and 
then turns round and applies to your lordship. This is not a case in which the Attorney 
General ought so to conduct himself.69 
 
The radicals were acquitted after the Manchester magistrate Colonel Sylvester 
acknowledged in his examination that he had instructed Nadin to send Fleming to the meeting 
to be asked to be “twisted in”, and the witnesses of the defence each contradicted Fleming’s 
evidence.70 E. P. Thompson pointed out that the decision of the judge (Baron Wood) and jury 
demonstrated that “Britain was not a police state”, and that the law officers were “well aware 
that conviction was not automatic”.71 Archibald Prentice, who later became a pro-reform 
journalist in Manchester, recalled in his 1851 memoir about the positive impact that the 
acquittal of the Thirty Eight had on the radical movement: “like the acquittal of Thomas 
Walker and John Horne Tooke, certainly tended to keep alive some feeling of confidence in a 
trial by jury as a safeguard of personal liberty”.72 He nevertheless noted the financial and 
psychological impact of the case: “an expensive trial (although the money was found by 
middle-class men …) and a long imprisonment previous to trial no doubt operated in the way 
of intimidation”. This view again reflects how the “reign of terror” was more about the fear 
of arrest and the consequences of prosecution than the actual number of prosecutions.73 In 
some senses, the trial of the Thirty Eight was an anomaly among the other cases brought to 
court in 1812-19, as it was the only one where the evidence for the prosecution was based on 
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one informer’s testimony, which as previous trials had shown, was never a good basis for 
success. The law officers ensured that in all the other cases brought to court were limited to 
overtly criminal acts such as frame-breaking and robbery of arms, and kept any evidence 
about political sedition in the background.74 
 
IV 
 
The case of the Thirty Eight occurred at the turning point when prosecutions of political 
radicals began to shift away from seditious libel towards conspiracy and seditious assembly. 
Local and national governments became more concerned about the potential for working-
class collective action in industrialising areas of Britain to instigate revolution more than the 
textual contents of pamphlets and newspapers. Political trials in this period widened the 
definition of treason to include threats to parliament as well as the monarch, and after the 
Peterloo Massacre and the Six Acts that followed, seditious conspiracy included intent to 
provoke riot and tumult against the constitution.75 Nonetheless, as illustrated in the law 
officers’ opinion books, the Tory governments of the era often took great care to ensure that 
cases were prosecutable with some chance of success, and they were usually highly sensitive 
to the liberties guaranteed by the process that could be exploited by clever lawyers and 
argued by the radicals themselves. The extent of repression was limited. It was limited by the 
law. It was limited by the processes of the law. It was limited by widely-held principles of an 
unwritten constitution. Though radicals accused the government of corruption, law makers 
and enforcers nevertheless respected the right to petition and to a fair trial, at least in theory if 
not always in practice.  
The government responded to periods of heightened political agitation such as 1799-
1801 and 1817-18 with suspension of habeas corpus legislation, showing how the state trial 
could never guarantee success for the prosecutors and during crises it was easier to arrest 
under direct warrant and keep the prisoners under lock and key without the opportunity for 
them to air their views in an open court. Radicals treated trials as battles about the 
constitution, with their grievances drawn from the language of Magna Carta as tutored by 
Major Cartwright and T. J. Wooler. They were therefore especially aggrieved by the 
suspension of habeas corpus acts, which appeared to remove their constitutional rights to a 
fair trial, and the use of special juries which to them was proof of government corruption. The 
impact of loyalist repression was real and significant, but because it appeared so 
unpredictable rather than because it was total in any way. Moreover, government repression 
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was channelled by the way in which power was distributed between central and provincial 
authorities. The main organs of law and order lay in the magistrates’ offices and the county 
court rooms rather than in the Home Office. The actions of local authorities were also highly 
significant in bringing radicals to the assizes in the first place, using spies and informers, 
intimidation and overtly anti-radical and indeed anti-working class statements in court and in 
the press. The Thirty Eight would not have been prosecuted had it not been for the zeal of 
deputy constable Joseph Nadin to root out all remaining “Jacobins” in Manchester, his 
determination proven again in August 1819 when he arrested the orators on the field of 
Peterloo. Power was personal. The personal interactions and the uneven balance of power 
between defendants and prosecution within the court room played a large part in determining 
the outcomes of the trials.  
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